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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-2012
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JACKIE HOLDER, etc., et al., PETITIONERS v.
E. K. HALL, Sr., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 30, 1994]

  Separate opinion of Justice Stevens, in which
Justice Blackmun, Justice Souter, and Justice
Ginsburg join.
   Justice Thomas has written a separate opinion
proposing that the terms -standard, practice, or proce-
dure- as used in the Voting Rights Act should hence-
forth be construed to refer only to practices that affect
minority citizens' access to the ballot.  Specifically,
Justice Thomas would no longer interpret the Act to
forbid practices that dilute minority voting strength.  To
the extent that his opinion advances policy arguments in
favor of that interpretation of the statute, it should be
addressed to Congress, which has ample power to amend
the statute.  To the extent that the opinion suggests
that federal judges have an obligation to subscribe to
the proposed narrow reading of statutory language, it is
appropriate to supplement Justice Thomas' writing with
a few words of history.

                      I
  Justice Thomas notes that the first generation of
Voting Rights Act cases focused on access to the ballot.
Ante, at 3-4.  By doing so, he suggests that the early
pattern of enforcement is an indication of the original
meaning of the statute.  In this regard, it is important
to note that the Court's first case addressing a voting
practice other than access to the ballot arose under the
Fifteenth Amendment.  In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U. S. 339 (1960), the Court held that a change in the
boundaries of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, violated
the Fifteenth Amendment.  In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Frankfurter wrote:
-The opposite conclusion urged upon us by respond-
ents, would sanction the achievement by a State of
any impairment of voting rights whatever so long as
it was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of
political subdivisions.-  Id., at 345.
-A statute which is alleged to have worked unconsti-
tutional deprivations of petitioners' rights is not
immune to attack simply because the mechanism
employed by the legislature is a redefinition of
municipal boundaries.  According to the allegations
here made, the Alabama Legislature has not merely
redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental
inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate
to say that it has deprived the petitioners of the
municipal franchise and consequent rights and to
that end it has incidentally changed the city's
boundaries.  While in form this is merely an act
redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are
established, the inescapable human effect of this
essay in geometry and geography is to despoil
colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their
theretofore enjoyed voting rights.-  Id., at 347.
  Because Gomillion was decided only a few years before
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, and because
coverage under the Voting Rights Act is generally
coextensive with or broader than coverage under the
Fifteenth Amendment, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641 (1966); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60-61
(1980) (plurality opinion), it is surely not unreasonable
to infer that Congress intended the Act to reach the
kind of voting practice that was at issue in that case.
Nevertheless, the text of the Act would also have
supported the opposite inference, because the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment would seem to forbid any
denial or abridgment of the right to vote, whereas 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act refer only to -voting
qualification[s,] . . . prerequisite[s] to voting, . . . stand-
ard[s], practice[s], [and] procedure[s].-
  During the years between 1965 and 1969 the question
whether the Voting Rights Act should be narrowly
construed to cover nothing more than impediments to
access to the ballot was an unresolved issue.  What
Justice Thomas describes as -a fundamental shift in
the focal point of the Act,- ante, at 2, occurred in 1969
when the Court unequivocally rejected the narrow
reading, relying heavily on a broad definition of the
term -voting- as including -`all action necessary to make
a vote effective.'-  Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U. S. 544, 565-566.
  Despite Allen's purported deviation from the Act's true
meaning, Congress one year later reenacted 5 without
in any way changing the operative words.  During the
next five years, the Court consistently adhered to Allen,
see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971); Georgia
v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973), and in 1975,
Congress again reenacted 5 without change.
  When, in the late seventies, some parties advocated a
narrow reading of the Act, the Court pointed to these
Congressional reenactments as solid evidence that Allen,
even if not correctly decided in 1969, would now be
clearly correct.  In United States v. Sheffield Bd. of
Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110, 132-133 (1978), the Court
noted:
-In 1970, Congress was clearly fully aware of this
Court's interpretation of 5 as reaching voter
changes other than those affecting the registration
process and plainly contemplated that the Act would
continue to be so construed.  See, e.g., Hearings on
H. R. 4249 et al. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 147-149, 154-155,
182-184, 402-454 (1969); Hearings on S. 818 et al.
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess., 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398,
426-427, 469 (1970) . . . .
     -The congressional history is even clearer with
respect to the 1975 extension . . . .-
As the Court in that case also noted, when Congress
reenacts a statute with knowledge of its prior interpreta-
tion, that interpretation is binding on the Court.
     -Whatever one might think of the other arguments
advanced, the legislative background of the 1975 re-
enactment is conclusive of the question before us.
When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its
approval of an administrative or other interpretation
thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that
interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby.
See, e.g., Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429
U. S. 569, 576-577 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975); H. Hart & A.
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1404 (tent. ed.
1958); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
401 U. S. 321, 336 n. 7 (1971); Girouard v. United
States, 328 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1946).  Don E. Williams
Co. v. Commissioner, supra, is instructive.  As here,
there had been a longstanding administrative
interpretation of a statute when Congress re-enacted
it, and there, as here, the legislative history of the
re-enactment showed that Congress agreed with that
interpretation, leading this Court to conclude that
Congress had ratified it.  429 U. S., at 574-577.-
Id., at 134-135.
  If the 1970 and 1975 reenactments had left any doubt
as to congressional intent, that doubt would be set aside
by the 1982 amendments to 2.  Between 1975 and
1982, the Court continued to interpret the Voting Rights
Act in the broad manner set out by Allen.  See City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980); Dougherty
County Bd. of Ed.  v. White, 439 U. S. 32 (1978); United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U. S. 144 (1977); City of Richmond v. United States,
422 U. S. 358 (1975).  In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55
(1980), a plurality of this Court concluded that violations
of both the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment required discriminatory purpose.  The case in-
volved a claim that at-large voting diluted minority
voting strength.  In his opinion for the plurality in
Bolden, Justice Stewart expressly relied upon Gomillion
v. Lightfoot's holding -that allegations of a racially
motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries stated
a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment.- 446 U. S., at
62; see also id., at 85-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).  The only reason Gomillion did not control
the outcome in Bolden was that an -invidious purpose-
had been alleged in the earlier case but not in Bolden.
446 U. S., at 63.  The congressional response to Bolden
is familiar history.  In the 1982 amendment to 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, Congress substituted a -results- test
for an intent requirement.  Pub. L. 97-205 3, 96 Stat.
134; see 42 U. S. C. 1973.  It is crystal clear that
Congress intended the 1982 amendment to cover non-
access claims like those in Bolden and Gomillion.

                     II
  Justice Thomas' narrow interpretation of the words
-voting qualification . . . standard, practice, or proce-
dure,- if adopted, would require us to overrule Allen and
the cases that have adhered to its reading of the critical
statutory language.  The radical character of that
suggested interpretation is illustrated by the following
passage from an opinion decided only nine years after
Allen:
     -The Court's decisions over the past 10 years have
given  5 the broad scope suggested by the language
of the Act.  We first construed it in Allen v. State
Board of Elections, [393 U. S. 544 (1969)].  There
our examination of the Act's objectives and original
legislative history led us to interpret  5 to give it
`the broadest possible scope,' 393 U. S., at 567, and
to require prior federal scrutiny of `any state enact-
ment which altered the election law in a covered
State in even a minor way.'  Id., at 566.  In so
construing  5, we unanimously rejected-as the
plain terms of the Act would themselves have
seemingly required-the argument of an appellee
that  5 should apply only to enactments affecting
who may register to vote.  393 U. S., at 564.  Our
decisions have required federal preclearance of laws
changing the location of polling places, see Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), laws adopting at-
large systems of election, ibid.; Fairley v. Patterson
(decided with Allen, supra); laws providing for the
appointment of previously elected officials, Bunton v.
Patterson (decided with Allen, supra); laws regulat-
ing candidacy, Whitley v. Williams (decided with
Allen, supra); laws changing voting procedures,
Allen, supra; annexations, City of Richmond v.
United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); City of Peters-
burg v. United States, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), sum-
marily aff'g 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972); Perkins v.
Matthews, supra; and reapportionment and redis-
tricting, Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976);
Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); see
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144
(1977).  In each case, federal scrutiny of the pro-
posed change was required because the change had
the potential to deny or dilute the rights conferred
by  4(a).-  United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Com-
m'rs, 435 U. S., at 122-123 (footnote omitted).

The Allen interpretation of the Act has also been
followed in a host of cases decided in later years, among
them Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney General of
Texas, 501 U. S. 419 (1991); Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 479 U. S. 462 (1987); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U. S. 30 (1986); Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U. S.
159 (1982);  City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S.
156 (1980); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439
U. S. 32 (1978).  In addition, Justice Thomas' interpre-
tation would call into question the numerous other cases
since 1978 that have assumed the broad coverage of the
Voting Rights Act that Justice Thomas would now have
us reject.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380 (1991);
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646 (1991); McCain v.
Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236 (1984); Hawthorn v. Lovorn, 457
U. S. 255 (1982); Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U. S. 393
(1982); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130 (1981); Berry
v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978); see also Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. ___ (1992); Voinovich
v. Quilter, 507 U. S. ___ (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507
U. S. ___ (1993); Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S.
125 (1983).
  The large number of decisions that we would have to
overrule or reconsider, as well as the congressional
reenactments discussed above, suggests that Justice
Thomas' radical reinterpretation of the Voting Rights
Act is barred by the well-established principle that stare
decisis has special force in the statutory arena.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. ___, ___ (1992);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164,
171-172 (1989); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S.
720, 736-737 (1977).
  Justice Thomas attempts to minimize the radical
implications of his interpretation of the phrase -voting
qualification . . . standard, practice, or procedure- by
noting that this case involves only the interpretation of
2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Section 5, he hints, might
be interpreted differently.  Even limiting the reinterpre-
tation to 2 cases, however, would require overruling a
sizable number of this Court's precedents. Houston
Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U. S.
419 (1991); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380 (1991);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986); see also
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. ___ (1993); Growe v.
Emison, 507 U. S. ___ (1993).  In addition, a distinction
between 2 and 5 is difficult to square with the
language of the statute.  Sections 2 and 5 contain
exactly the same words: -voting qualification . . . stand-
ard, practice, or procedure.-  If anything, the wording of
5 is narrower, because it adds the limiting phrase -with
respect to voting- after the word -procedure.-  Moreover,
when Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982
in response to Bolden, it amended 2.  As noted above,
in those amendments Congress clearly endorsed the
application of the Voting Rights Act to vote dilution
claims.  While a distinction between 2 and 5 might be
supportable on policy grounds, it is an odd distinction
for devotees of -plain language- interpretation.
  Throughout his opinion, Justice Thomas argues that
this case is an exception to stare decisis, because Allen
and its progeny have -immersed the federal courts in a
hopeless project of weighing questions of political
theory.-  Ante, at 1.  There is no question that the
Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve
difficult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from
an interpretation that Congress has thrice approved.
Statutes frequently require courts to make policy
judgments.  The Sherman Act, for example, requires
courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic
organization.  Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
has required the courts to formulate a theory of equal
opportunity.  Our work would certainly be much easier
if every case could be resolved by consulting a dic-
tionary, but when Congress has legislated in general
terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid
difficult questions.

                     III
  When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly,
and consistently construed for more than a quarter
century, and when Congress has reenacted and extended
the statute several times with full awareness of that
construction, judges have an especially clear obligation
to obey settled law.  Whether Justice Thomas is correct
that the Court's settled construction of the Voting Rights
Act has been -a disastrous misadventure,- ante, at 2,
should not affect the decision in this case.  It is there-
fore inappropriate for me to comment on the portions of
his opinion that are best described as an argument that
the statute be repealed or amended in important
respects.